982 A.2d at 304–05 (noting the defendant's argument invoked D.C. Code § 2–1402.01 ). § 1614.103(d)(4) (stating that "[a]liens employed in positions, or who apply for positions, located outside the United States" are not protected). Compl. On March 10, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, sued Defendant over his termination. Kambala went on to say that she was given a contract to work at a care home for the elderly and loved to work with elderly people. Judgment is appropriate when a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Because the court has found a plausible claim for breach of an express contract, it need not consider at this stage Plaintiff's alternative implied-in-fact contract and promissory estoppel claims. § 2000e(f), but similarity situated non-United States citizens do not, 42 U.S.C. § 626(e). ¶ XVIII. Compl. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant fired him because he is black and because he is a citizen of Congo, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. In light of Defendant's briefing, the court need not decide whether Plaintiff is proceeding under one or both theories.--------. Save Save this search and get alerts by email. See Shekoyan , 409 F.3d at 422 (concluding that non-resident foreign alien was outside Title VII's protections even though employer's hiring decision and subsequent employment decisions about the employee were made within the United States). Thus, the court held that although merely alleging that an employer is headquartered in the District of Columbia or has offices here would not be enough to implicate the DCHRA, the DCHRA's protections apply so long as the alleged discriminatory decision is made in the District of Columbia, or its effects are felt here, or both. The Task Order further states that "[n]o replacement may be made by the Contractor without the written consent of the Contracting Officer." Henry Morris, Jr., Stewart S. Manela, Arent Fox, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants. ¶ XVIII n.3. “She went over to Nigeria to visit friends and family before starting this position, it had been a planned journey and it was only upon her return that she engaged with it. (citation omitted)). at 4. ����6��0NЅz�%��/~�Zwu���NvD�������(�Z�D�PI�O�/؛�"u��ɗ at 305. Article 14 states, in relevant part: "In the event of a conflict between the Prime Contract and this Agreement, the Prime Contract shall control." The court granted the motion on May 4, 2017, finding that Plaintiff had waived his right to arbitrate by filing suit. Fed. Yet, the court in Monteilh concluded that the plaintiff's claim fell within the scope of the DCHRA because his employer "ha[d] made a discriminatory decision in the District of Columbia, although the effects have been felt elsewhere." at 3. The court heard that following a quick search, officials found 58,000 Benson and Hedges cigarettes in the three cases. 2011). Kambala Jobs. Appearing today at Manchester Magistrates Court, Kambala, of Swedish origin, said she had been approached at Brussels airport on her return journey by a man called ‘Walter’. SEARCH & FILTER. 2017) (quoting 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1369 (3d ed. Follow throughout the day for the latest Man United transfer news including updates on Jadon Sancho, Alex Telles and Dayot Upamecano. Finally, Defendant points to the D.C. Council's expression of intent contained in the DCHRA as evidence of its limited application. “She arrived in the UK on February 14, the next day she appeared before the courts,” Mr Wallace said. Id. See Mem. Maga Kambala was approached by a man called 'Walter' to bring the suitcases to the UK. of Points and Authorities in Supp., ECF No. change. Id. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment based on an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The claim of failure to provide written particulars of employment contrary to section 4 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is not well-founded and is dismissed. In Monteilh , the D.C. Court of Appeals considered whether a plaintiff who lived and worked outside of the District could bring a DCHRA claim against his District of Columbia-based employer. Construing the Second Amended Complaint in that way, Plaintiff has stated a tortious interference claim against Defendant under a respondeat superior theory of liability. Plaintiff further avers that this statement was false, "made out of malice," and that no privilege applies to the statement. 's Opp'n], at 23–24. Plaintiff contends that because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued him a right-to-sue letter, instead of rejecting his claim outright, he is eligible for Title VII's protections.